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Does Banking Union Worsen the EU’s Democratic Deficit?
The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency*
CHRISTOPHER GANDRUD and MARK HALLERBERG
Hertie School of Governance
Abstract
Does banking union exacerbate the European Union’s democratic deficit? Using Scharpf’s ‘input’
and ‘output’ legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the
democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit ‘input legitimacy’ for politically independent
institutions. ‘Output legitimacy’ is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of ‘output
legitimacy’. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public’s interest and can
improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data
available to the European public is evaluated and compared to America’s banking union. European
practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant
officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any
information on the banks they supervise. Both EU and national supervisors should provide publicly
available, timely and consistent individual bank data.
Introduction
One response European Union Member States have made to the recent financial crisis is
increased integration of their banking supervision under a system known as the ‘single
supervisory mechanism’ (SSM) (see Howarth and Quaglia, 2013). In autumn 2014, a new
supervisory board within the European Central Bank (ECB) has been given the primary
task of supervizing large and systemically important banks in participating Member
States, whose own supervisors will continue to regulate smaller banks (Gros and
Schoenmaker, 2014). The stakes for the EU are large. As the recent financial crisis
illustrates, inadequate supervisory actions can have significant costs for taxpayers not only
in the Member State where failed banks are based, but also in other Member States in
terms of lost revenue, output and jobs. This is going to become even more of an issue
within Europe as the single resolution mechanism (SRM) commits public resources to
deal with failing banks.
We use Scharpf’s (1970; 1999) well-established input and output legitimacy concepts
to assess the democratic legitimacy of financial supervision in the European banking
union. Input legitimacy, which is the responsiveness to citizen concerns through their
participation, is typically low for regulators. Citizens generally do not directly elect them,
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and it is usually difficult for the ‘people’s representatives’ (that is, the government) to hold
them accountable once they have been appointed. There is a consensus around the
rationale for limiting input legitimacy – political independence makes it more likely that
the body acts in the best interests of the population (for example, Kydland and Prescott,
1977; Majone, 2000; Rogoff, 1985). However, we show that by the standard set by the
highly independent conduct of monetary policy under the European Central Bank (ECB),
the SSM is even further removed from citizens. This makes output legitimacy especially
important.
We show that the SSM’s output legitimacy is also weak when compared to the
legitimacy of monetary policy actors in the ECB and when compared to other settings,
such as supervision in the United States. This is because of a lack of supervisory data
transparency that would make it easier for observers to evaluate whether the supervisor is
acting in citizens’ best interests.
Supervisory transparency ‘can be defined as the extent to which the supervisor dis-
closes information that is related to the supervisory process’ (Liedorp et al., 2013, p.
313). Sundararajan et al. (2003) highlight three types of transparency: consistent policy
objectives; well-founded legal, institutional and economic basis; and the provision of
data and information needed to create an informed view of supervisory decisions. Simi-
larly, building on Eijffinger and Geraats’ (2006) measure of monetary policy transpar-
ency, Liedorp et al. (2013) identify the importance of what they call ‘economic
transparency’ – the data and information used as input for supervisory policy-making.1
In this article we focus on the striking lack of data and information transparency in the
European banking union.
Bank data transparency is a key component of output legitimacy because it allows
parliaments and the public to judge supervisors’ decisions and it improves supervisory
outputs – namely financial stability and market efficiency. Transparent individual bank
supervisory data has a number of characteristics – all of which make it feasible to create
an informed view of supervisors’ decisions. First it needs to be publicly available. Given
current technology, this means it is available through an open and easy-to-use website.
The data needs to be released in a timely manner so that ideally it can be evaluated before
severe problems emerge, rather than after. The reporting period also needs to be relatively
frequent (for example, quarterly) so that it can provide relevant snapshots of banks and
banking system health. Data should also be consistent both in terms of file format and in
the reporting and definitions of variables. This enables easy analysis and comparison
across banks and supervisors. It is beyond the scope of this article to stipulate exactly
which quantities should be reported. At the very least, the quantities that regulators use
should be reported, as should quantities that are necessary for judging the health of banks
and banking systems, such as capital adequacy ratios and non-performing loan ratios.
Ideally, these sets of data overlap.
The current lack of transparency is particularly striking when compared to well-
established practices in another large banking union – the United States. The Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) co-ordinates the reporting of timely,
consistent and publicly accessible quarterly supervisory filing data on all American banks
1 Liedorp et al. (2013) also identify other components of supervisory transparency: political, procedural, policy and
operational. We focus on data transparency in this article because it is particularly lacking in the emerging banking union.
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that receive Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) coverage, or roughly 8,200
banks. Moreover, with minor exceptions, it makes this data entirely public in consistent
file formats in a timely manner. We would like to make clear that this data is far from
perfect. Yet it is useful to compare the availability of data in Europe to the American
benchmark.
We will first explain why it is important for democratic legitimacy, and particularly
output legitimacy, that SSM regulators provide publicly accessible, timely and consistent
data. We then review the American framework and benchmark the current state of
supervisory information from both the EU and Member States with the American system.
There is only limited data available from EU-level authorities. We conducted an original
survey of relevant supervisors in all EU Member States in an attempt to access individual
bank data from their jurisdictions. None approaches the United States’ level of regulatory
filing transparency. This lack of data transparency damages the European banking union’s
efficiency and, in so doing, its democratic legitimacy.
I. Individual Bank Regulatory Data Availability and Democratic Legitimacy
The EU is often accused of lacking democratic legitimacy and having a ‘democratic
deficit’ (for example, Hix, 2008). There are many reasons given for this: national execu-
tives may be subject to less oversight and scrutiny at the European level than domestically;
the one directly elected body, the European Parliament, is institutionally weak; there is a
lack of democratic contestation (for example, Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Scharpf, 1999;
Schmidt, 2006).
Arguments in defence of the democratic merits of technocratic governance in the EU
focus on the governance of specific policy areas (for example, Majone, 2000; Moravcsik,
2002). In those areas in which the EU has the most competence, such as monetary policy
and regulation, many polities delegate their decision-making and implementation to a
body of experts.
One way to address this debate is to consider legitimacy at two stages of the policy
process (see Schmidt, 2012, p. 3) – namely through inputs and outputs. Scharpf (1999) is
a proponent of using this approach to considering the EU, and he argues that it is too
removed from ‘input legitimacy’ so reformers should therefore concentrate on ‘output
legitimacy’. He also notes that ‘input legitimacy’ for technical areas such as monetary
policy and bank supervision is not even desirable because political influence may lead to
sub-optimal outcomes (Scharpf, 1999, p. 188). In practice, it is extremely rare for coun-
tries to have voters elect regulators directly. Rather than try to address problems of
democratic input legitimacy through limiting regulators’ independence, it should be pos-
sible to assess output legitimacy and there should be strong checks and balances in place
to hold regulators accountable for deviating from their objectives (Majone, 1999).
What ‘legitimacy’ exists for the supervision in the banking union and the SSM in
particular? For context and given existing arguments that monetary policy lacks input
legitimacy (again intentionally so), it is useful to compare the appointment process of the
SSM supervisory board with the process to appoint members of the ECB’s governing
council. The ECB’s executive board is appointed by a qualified majority of the European
Council, itself composed of elected Member State governments. The larger governing
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council includes the executive board and the governors of the eurozone national central
banks. Their elected Member State governments appoint the governors. Nominated board
members appear before the ECON committee of the European Parliament after their
nomination to make a statement and to ask questions. While its role is only consultative
and it cannot block candidates, the ECON committee does make a recommendation to the
European Parliament on the approval of the candidate and it can ask the Council to
nominate another candidate (Claeys et al., 2014).
There is some debate over whether or not the ECB’s monetary policy governance
structures impair democratic legitimacy (for example, Jabko, 2003; Moravcsik, 2002;
Verdun, 1999). Nevertheless, the appointment of SSM policy-makers is closer to the
voters in one respect, but further removed in others. The SSM supervisory board consists
of a chair, a vice chair, four ECB representatives and one representative from the com-
petent supervisory authority2 in each SSM Member State.3 The legislation that establishes
the SSM strengthens the role of the European Parliament in comparison to the selection
of the ECB board – this body needs to confirm the selection of the chair and the vice chair
of the supervisory board.4 This power makes it more similar to the appointment process of
the chair of the Federal Reserve Bank or the FDIC, which require United States Senate
confirmation. Nevertheless, the ECB maintains agenda-setting power in terms of appoint-
ing the nominees, and while the vice chair receives European Parliamentary approval she
is a current member of the ECB executive board. The four additional ECB representatives
are chosen internally and their selection is constrained only by the requirement that they
not be directly involved in monetary policy-making. When combined with the vice chair,
five of the six non-national representatives come from the ECB, which proposes all of
them. The selection of the Member State representatives is less defined; the legislation
states only that they be from Member State supervisory authorities. These authorities
generally are either independent central banks or separate financial regulators. It is not yet
clear how these authorities will select their supervisory board representative or how
involved national parliaments will be in their selection, if at all.
In general, the SSM supervisory board has no more ‘input legitimacy’ than the ECB,
and perhaps less. In most cases, holding the SSM supervisory board accountable through
appointments means changing policy-makers that are primarily responsible for monetary
policy.
II. Transparency and Observing Outputs
For regulators in general and the SSM in particular, the focus of ensuring legitimacy is
therefore on ‘output legitimacy’. Do supervisors take actions that are in the best interests of
the publics they are supposed to serve? Or do they make decisions that favour a narrower
interest, such as particular banks? As Moravcsik (2002, p. 612) argues, ‘transparent
policy-making’ is an important component of ‘democratic legitimacy’ and he suggests that
ex ante and ex post parliamentary scrutiny of EU actions creates this transparency.
2 The EBA maintains a list of these authorities at: «http://www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-
disclosure/national-authorities».
3 Eurozone countries participate automatically in the SSM, while other Member States may apply to participate.
4 See ‘Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) between European Parliament and ECB on the cooperation on procedures related
to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)’, Brussels, 12 September 2013.
4 Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg
© 2014 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
In practice, there are two ways to monitor supervisor performance to assess output
legitimacy according to the literature: ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ (McCubbins and
Schwartz, 1984). The former involves regular oversight. Consistent with Moravcsik
(2002), a common way of running ‘police patrols’ on supervisors is to have a legislative
committee hold regular hearings where the supervisor is expected to brief the legislators
and respond to questions and concerns legislators have.
In Germany, the Bundestag Finance Committee holds hearings involving the supervi-
sors. Given privacy laws, the regulator is not allowed to divulge specific details about bank
balance sheets even in confidence before the committee. This means that Members of
Parliament do not have access to any more balance sheet information than members of the
public. This creates large information asymmetries between regulators and MPs, inhibit-
ing effective, already costly, monitoring (see McCubbins et al., 1987, p. 247). Based on
the passage of a recent law that implements Basel III in national legislation, however, this
changed on a need-to-know basis – as of 2014, parliamentary investigative committees are
allowed access to such information.5 Rather than ‘police patrols’, such power amounts to
‘police investigations’ – that is, there is a potential ability to check, but not regular
oversight of the books of individual banks.
There will be a similar sort of arrangement in the European Parliament for the SSM.
Based on an inter-institutional agreement between the European Parliament and the ECB,6
there will be hearings of the ECB before a committee of the European Parliament twice
a year to enable ‘procedural oversight’ (see Majone, 2000, pp. 293–4). More specific
hearings are confidential, as is potentially much of the information the ECB will give the
European Parliament regarding specific companies and individuals. Moreover, the ECB
has pledged to co-operate with European Parliament investigations. Whether MEPs will
have access to the same amount of detail about the balance sheet of a specific bank is
unclear, but it appears that, as in the German case, this would presumably be an agenda
item only when there is an ‘investigation’.7
These ‘police patrols’ are certainly useful, but one should consider to whom they report
and where they patrol. The information in both the German and European cases is often
presented in a confidential forum, and only the members of the respective parliaments
have a chance to participate. This means that MEPs will have the chance to review what
the ECB is doing, while German MPs can investigate the German supervisor. The ECB
will supervise about 130 of the largest banks, while the national supervisors will be
responsible for the remainder. Taken together, the ‘police patrols’ will generally occur in
isolation. This is fine if one thinks that supervisors will be equally tough across all
Member States. There may be concern, however, that national supervisors will choose
forbearance for national firms; a given Member State’s supervisor may give its banks
more time, possibly creating negative externalities for other Member State banks and
ultimately other Member States’ public finances. There will be no opportunity for other
Member State or MEPs to evaluate or question the supervisor. This is a fundamental
5 See Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Beschlussempfehlung des Finanzausschusses’, Drucksache 17/13524, 15 May 2013, p. 29.
Available at: «http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/135/1713524.pdf».
6 The text of the agreement can be found at: «http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201311/
20131107ATT74064/20131107ATT74064EN.pdf».
7 See «http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130912IPR19704/html/Declarationof-the-President
-of-the-EP-and-of-the-President-of-the-ECB».
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problem of the ‘police patrol’ method of providing output legitimacy in the European
banking union. Even in the best circumstances, ‘police patrols’ are costly for parliamen-
tarians (Lupia and McCubbins, 1994, p. 104). It takes time, effort and expertise to analyze
complex financial data.
‘Fire alarms’are another device used to address ‘output legitimacy’. The public receives
regular information about a given topic, and the public (typically expert interest groups) will
set off an alarm if there really is a problem. This type of oversight works only if there is data
transparency – it must be possible for non-policy-makers to evaluate what the supervisor is
doing. Nongovernmental actors cannot perform this function if individual bank filing data
is secret. To make a judgment on regulator decisions, the public needs to be able to observe
not only supervisory actions, but also the context in which they were made. If supervisors
know the public will have the same data and are therefore able to scrutinize them, they may
be more likely to take actions in the public’s interest in the first place.
It is useful to again compare the SSM to the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy.
Though many aspects of European monetary policy-making are secret (governing council
minutes are not published), basic data like the inflation rate that the public needs to assess
ECB monetary policy outputs is readily available and released shortly after policy-makers
themselves obtain it. As such, it is possible to observe changes in the price level in near
real time, conduct ‘police patrols’ and ring ‘fire alarms’ well before price instability
becomes a major problem. The same rationale exists for supervisory data. This data is
more complex than information on inflation and analysts in the private sector and NGOs
need time to scrutinize the data before a ‘fire alarm’ can be rung. As the purpose of
financial regulation is to prevent the negative externalities of bank failures, it is preferable
to assess regulator outputs before it is ‘too late’ and one or more banks fail.
Supervisory transparency is an important component of democratic accountability of
any regulatory agency (Amtenbrink and Lastra, 2008; Liedorp et al., 2013).8 It may also
lead to greater independence from political principals because accountability generates
legitimacy among the population, and this legitimacy translates into greater support for
independence (Hüpkes et al., 2005).
III. Transparency and Improving Outputs
Not only is transparency important for assessing if regulators are effective, it also directly
contributes to output legitimacy because it leads to efficient outcomes for the public in
terms of a more integrated single market in financial services and more disciplined
financial markets generally. It may also lower the public costs of bank resolution. The
European financial market is fragmented. Borrowers predominantly borrow from domes-
tic banks and lenders predominately lend to domestic borrowers. Banks ask for high
premiums when they do lend across borders. Failed bank resolution is more difficult
because banks are less willing to merge with or acquire banks in other Member States,
thus limiting the number of potential private sector resolution options (Sapir and Wolff,
2013). An important impediment to the development of a single European financial
services market is a lack of trust that banks have in the stability of other Member State
banks. The 2014 asset quality review and the SSM in general are meant to overcome this
8 Quintyn et al. (2007, p. 11) similarly suggest that transparency ‘encourages open administration and serves the function
of enhancing public confidence in the financial supervisor’.
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problem. However, without supervisory data transparency, regulators are asking banks to
trust that they are adequately enforcing regulations. Transparency could improve super-
visor credibility with market actors and would be helpful for improving the European
single market in financial services.
In terms of the private sector, previous research has shown that the more and higher
quality data companies make available, the better understanding analysts have of the
companies. This improves their predictions about bank profits and losses, thus improving
investor decisions (Roulstone, 2003; Yu, 2010). When investors have better information,
banks make better decisions. If investors and depositors can observe bank decisions, then
they will ‘punish’ banks for risky decisions through higher borrowing costs.9 Banks
therefore have an incentive to decrease their risk profile when there is higher transparency.
If risk-taking is unobservable, banks will take positions with higher risk (see Blum, 2002;
Cordella and Yeyati, 1998; Baumann and Nier, 2003).
A common argument against regulatory data transparency is that it is bad for financial
stability. If investors learn that a bank is in trouble, there may be a run on it, and this could
hurt the whole system. This would be especially troublesome for banks that suffer from
exogenous shocks and that had not engaged in overly risky behaviour before (Cordella and
Yeyati, 1998). However, Nier (2005) found that more transparent banks (that is, those that
reported data in their published accounts) were less likely to experience a crisis. Similarly,
in a cross-country study, Tadesse (2006) found that countries with greater regulated bank
disclosure requirements have fewer banking crises. This suggests that the net effect of
transparency on financial stability is positive.
There is another efficiency reason why greater transparency is relevant, especially for
Europe given the introduction of tougher rules in the SRM that require a significant bail-in
of junior asset holders if a decision is taken to resolve a bank. Investors will become junior
asset holders only if they have information on the health of each bank. If that information
is not forthcoming, they will demand a premium. This, in turn, will make capital more
expensive in Europe.
While unexpected revelations of significant bad financial data may lead to a bank run
and thereby undermine stability, this is actually a reason to report regularly trusted
financial data for individual banks. Regular data releases allow the public to be better
aware of overly risky behaviour before problems reach a crisis point. It incentivizes
regulators to take actions before they build up as they know that parliamentarians and the
public would be critical of them looking the other way. And it incentivizes banks to make
more prudent lending decisions as their cost of capital is more likely to increase if markets
have a full understanding of their risky behaviour.
Another argument concerns the privacy rights of companies. In stark contrast to
regulators in the United States, a significant proportion of European supervisors do not
release individual bank filing data because they treat this information as confidential and
often regard it as commercially sensitive. Disseminating the data may reveal information
that competitors could use to their advantage, especially competitors based in jurisdictions
that do not make such data available.
In an ideal world where banks do not create significant negative externalities – includ-
ing large public costs for containing and resolving financial crises – it would indeed be
9 This assumes that creditors and depositors are not fully insured.
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reasonable not to release such data. However, the line between private sector banks and the
public sector is blurry. As the recent financial crisis has reminded us, bank liabilities are
effectively contingent liabilities for the public. Private sector (and publicly owned) banks
can create very significant negative externalities (De Nicolò et al., 2012). The public
interest in transparency for enabling effective supervision outweighs general privacy
concerns. Nonetheless, there is certainly a case to be made that specific information that
is private to individuals, such as individuals’ bank records, should remain confidential. In
general, this information is not needed to judge supervisors’ outputs nor would its release
enhance financial stability or the integration of Europe’s financial markets.
In short, with few exceptions, good information on the health of European banks could
lead to a more efficient banking union and thus more legitimate supervisory outcomes.
IV. Assessing Supervisory Data Transparency in the EU
Given the important role that supervisory data transparency could play in enhancing the
otherwise weak legitimacy of the European banking union, it is important to assess the
level of transparency of European supervisors. This will help us judge legitimacy during
the crucial early stages of banking union and highlight what needs to be improved. To do
this we first establish a feasible real-world benchmark for timely, consistent and publicly
available data found in the United States’ large banking union. Then we compare this to
European practices learned from a new survey of European supervisors.
V. An Established Banking Union Benchmark: The United States
The United States has adopted a highly transparent system of individual bank regulatory
filing data dissemination. Its example demonstrates that a relatively high level of super-
visory transparency is compatible with a large and vibrant banking sector. All banks that
receive federal deposit insurance are required to make ‘call reports’ every quarter. Infor-
mation includes earnings, balance sheet, asset quality, liquidity and capital (Flood et al.,
2012). These are typically available the day after the regulator receives them, and they are
freely available for download from the FFIEC’s website10 in a number of file formats that
can be opened by a variety of software programs. Quarterly data is available from 2001
through the present. The data can be bulk downloaded all at once for each quarter.
Quarterly files can be easily merged using widely available software, allowing both
bank-level and banking system-level analyses over time. Consistent definitions and tags
are used for each quantity in the data set. The level of balance sheet disaggregation is fine
grained. This allows one to examine a bank’s exposure to specific sectors. Importantly,
there is detailed data on non-performing loans – a key indicator of bank health. Quantities
are typically presented in three ways: domestic, foreign and consolidated between the two,
allowing researchers to examine how exposed individual banks are to difficulties in
foreign financial markets.11
In addition to call reports, the Federal Reserve requires larger and more diverse bank
holding companies that often engage in investment as well as retail banking to submit
10 See «https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/PWS/DownloadBulkData.aspx».
11 It is important to note that the specific markets are not recorded in this data.
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reports every quarter. The reports are co-ordinated with the call reports and contain income
and balance sheet information, as well as supporting schedules on quantities such as
off-balance sheet items. The Federal Reserve uses them as ‘a primary analytical tool [for
monitoring] financial institutions between on-site inspections’.12 The Federal ReserveY-9C
reports are generally public,13 and can be accessed electronically either on an individual
bank holding company basis from the FFIEC14 or as a bulk download in a variety of
formats.15 Usually the data is available within 24 hours of its submission or revision.
Data in these reports is designed to work with data sets created by other government
agencies enabling relatively easy analysis of supervisors’ outputs. For example, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago maintains a list of mergers, acquisitions and failures that
have occurred between banks and bank holding companies since 1976. This data base’s
design intentionally allows it to be easily merged with the bank holding company and call
reports data bases. It contains data not only on mergers, acquisitions and failures, but also
whether public assistance was used. Being able to easily combine individual bank super-
visory filings with decisions to provide individual banks with public assistance in the
event that they fail makes the process of evaluating public institutions’ resolution deci-
sions relatively straightforward.
We would like to emphasize that this discussion does not mean that the American
system is perfect. Levine (2012) chronicles a number of examples where regulators in the
United States took actions that were not in the public interest and directly contributed to
the recent financial crisis. He argues that one of the primary reasons that regulators were
able to take these decisions is that the public and elected officials did not have enough
information to evaluate them. The desired standard of transparency may therefore be
higher than what one finds in the United States.
VI. Practice in the EU
The ECB is only just beginning its SSM role. As of 2014 it does not release any
supervisory data on individual banks that it will supervise and it has not decided whether
or not it will release the data in the future.16 There have been some recent moves by the
European Banking Authority (EBA) to increase transparency. However, these efforts fall
far short of the benchmark set in the United States for enabling output legitimacy. We also
surveyed all EU Member States and found that, especially among eurozone Member
States that are in the SSM, national regulators release very little, if any, data.
VII. Reporting through the EBA
The current initiatives to increase transparency have significant deficiencies in terms of
making data publicly available in timely and consistent formats. Furthermore, there is
poor compliance by banks and Member States with the standards that are in place. To
12 See «http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms/reportdetail.aspx?sOoYJ+5BzDal8cbqnRxZRg==».
13 A few items in the report are automatically treated as confidential, and confidentiality can be requested in order to protect
a significant competitive position or personal privacy.
14 See «https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/help/helpFinancialReport.htm».
15 See «http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/bhc_data.cfm».
16 This was verified in a number of exchanges with ECB officials.
Does banking union worsen the EU’s democratic deficit? 9
© 2014 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
promote greater ‘market discipline and financial stability’ in 2012 and 2013, the EBA
conducted ‘transparency exercises’ for the 64 banks that were part of the 2012
recapitalization exercise. These have fairly detailed data about individual banks, including
their capital, risk weighted assets and sovereign exposure.17 The data is downloadable in
a variety of formats. Nonetheless, it has a number of limitations. The data is collected only
for an important, but nonetheless very small, subset of European banks. Many key banks
are not included, such as all of the banks in Spain that received public assistance to
strengthen their capital in the recent financial crisis.18 The data is not particularly timely;
the 2013 exercise was released in December 2013, but it only covers the first half of 2013.
As the EBA does not independently gather data but relies on Member State supervisors,
the International Monetary Fund has raised concerns about the EBA’s ability to verify the
accuracy of the data (IMF, 2013, p. 4). Finally, the recapitalization exercise upon which
the transparency exercise is based is a ‘one-off’.19
One place that the EU has mandated regular individual bank transparency is with the
recent Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV).20 This implements Basel Pillar 3 and
mandates that individual banks publicly disclose information related to their capital
adequacy and risk exposure. The EBA will issue further guidelines in 2014 on how banks
should make these disclosures. Though this is a positive step, it has a number of draw-
backs. As of 2013, banks have the leeway to choose what information to report, what
format to report it in and at what frequency. So far compliance with Pillar 3 requirements
has been poor. The EBA has been critical of the lack of information that banks provide. In
its 2012 assessment of 19 bank reports, the EBA (2013, p. 4) states that, as with the year
before, ‘no institution has fully complied with all of the requirements assessed’. Apart
from monitoring the reports and establishing best practices, the EBA is unable to compel
banks to meet the requirements.
In addition to establishing guidelines for Pillar 3 reports and monitoring these reports,
the EBA and its predecessor, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS),
have gathered and released Member State-level macro-prudential data required by the
2006 Capital Requirements Directive (CRD III)21 since 2007.22 Importantly, this data is
only at the aggregate level; one cannot trace the health of any individual bank, which
means that it is a less effective way to evaluate what the supervisor is doing. The type of
data reported includes the number of credit institutions in each Member State; overall
asset and capital levels; key measures of credit, operational and market risk; and national
supervisory actions, such as the number of on-site inspections (Table 1). This could be
used as a way of developing a basic understanding of regulator actions in the absence of
bank-level data. However, even though the data is only reported in aggregate, it is up to
Member State regulators to determine if the data is confidential. The EBA has no ability
to gather the data on its own.
17 See the EBA press release at: «http://andrewgelman.com/2013/12/17/replication-backlash/».
18
‘European Banking Authority Releases “Transparency Exercise” of Major EEA Banks Ahead of ECB Asset Quality
Review’. Euro Intelligence News Briefing, 18 December 2013.
19 See the EBA description at: «http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-capital-exercise».
20 For the full text, see «http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:176:0001:01:EN:HTML».
21 Available at: «http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:177:0001:01:EN:HTML».
22 See «http://www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/aggregate-statistical-data».
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VIII. Member State Data Availability
To examine further how timely, consistent and publicly available individual bank regula-
tory filing data is in the EU compared to the United States we conducted a survey of
Member State regulators based on a list created by the EBA.23 We asked each agency24 if
it or any other agency in the country makes supervisory filing data available. We then
examined the data and noted its basic characteristics. Of the 28 EU Member States, the
data is available electronically in some form in 11. This includes Bulgaria, Denmark,
Finland and Spain. Of the remaining 17, nine stated that this data was treated as confi-
dential and so do not make it available. In some cases, such as in the United Kingdom and
Germany, confidentiality has a legal basis. In others, such as Austria, confidentiality is
based on the supervisor’s ‘professional obligations’. A total of eight countries neither
described the data as confidential to us nor made it available electronically.25 In sum,
individual bank filing data of any kind was only accessible in about 40 per cent of EU
Member States. Of the 18 SSM countries, as of January 2014, only five (Estonia, Finland,
Latvia, Portugal and Spain) have any accessible data.
Moreover, among the countries that make some data available, the frequency of
reporting as well as its quality varies. For example, data is available monthly for Spanish
commercial banks, but only annually in Finland. The time span of the coverage also varies:
the Czech Republic makes data available going back to the year 2000, while Latvia has only
released data from the third quarter of 2012. The data is not reported in a consistent file
format across the countries. Bulgaria releases a Microsoft Excel workbook every quarter
with income statements in English for each bank on their own sheet. Portugal makes
supervisory data available in PDF files, one per bank per filing period. It is also only
available in Portuguese. Spain, through the Spanish Bankers Association (Asociación
Española de Banca) and Spanish Savings BankAssociation (Sector Cajas), makes the most
complete data set available of any EU Member State. Monthly filing data is available from
2002 until the present for savings banks and on a quarterly basis from 2004 for commercial
banks. For most months, individual bank filing data is available in a variety of file formats.
Given the rules at the beginning of 2014, it is up to national regulators to make any of this
data available. If regulators or national governments felt it is in their interest to stop
publishing the data, there is no European-level requirement to continue.
From this survey of minimal data availability practices, we have found that the majority
of European countries do not make individual bank data electronically available to the
public. Even among countries that do make data available, there are a variety of practices
concerning the timeliness and consistency of the data. It is therefore difficult for the
European public, and publics in individual Member States, to be able to hold their
supervisors accountable for their actions.
It is important to emphasize that this survey was of minimal data sharing practices. We
did not fully catalogue the range of quantities being recorded (for example, breakdowns
of assets by class and non-performing loans) in the individual bank filing data. For most
23 See «http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/credit-institutions-register».
24 We emailed each agency at least twice. If we did not receive a response, we followed up with telephone calls.
25 In these cases, we received written or verbal confirmation from the relevant agency that the information is not regularly
electronically available to the public. In some of these countries, such as Sweden, data can be accessed on a case-by-case
basis by contacting the supervisor directly.
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countries that reported data, they reported fairly simple balance sheet data. Even in Spain,
which has some of the most complete reporting, non-performing loans – a crucial quantity
for determining a bank’s health – are not included in any detail. No Member State reports
data at the level of detail that one finds in the United States.
There are recent moves at the European level, particularly at the EBA, to standardize
individual bank regulatory filing data collection and dissemination. The common report-
ing (COREP) for capital adequacy and financial reporting (FINREP) for financial infor-
mation standards aim, for the first time, to establish standardized quarterly regulatory
reporting requirements for European banks.26 Clearly having common reporting standards
will improve the ECB supervisors’ ability to monitor European banks under the SSM.
Nonetheless, though common reporting standards will be adopted by all EU Member
States and the ECB will develop its own capacity to gather information on some of the
eurozone’s major banks, this will likely have little impact on the public’s ability to access
the data unless the regulators and Member States decide to make it publicly available. As
such, the banking union’s output legitimacy remains low.
Conclusions
Making individual bank filing data publicly available in a timely and consistent manner
does not guarantee that banks will not fail and financial crises will not happen. Spain,
which, compared to its European counterparts has good though minimal data reporting,
nonetheless has suffered from a difficult banking crisis. Despite availability, the data
certainly did not prevent the crisis in the United States. Perhaps part of the problem is that
the level of detail available even in these two countries is still inadequate. For example, the
United States failed to increase transparency in derivatives markets despite an initiative in
1998–2000, and this transparency would have been helpful in the run-up to the 2008 crisis
(Admati and Hellwig, 2013, p. 204). In Spain, important quantities such as non-
performing loans are not in any detail. Furthermore, just because data is available to the
public to be used to hold regulators accountable it does not mean that they will actually do
so. This lends support to Levine’s (2012) argument that bank regulatory filing data needs
to not only be publicly available, but that there needs to be an independent and skillful
institution that regularly evaluates banking system health and raises issues that may be of
public concern.27 In the European case, the EBA could possibly take on such a role.
However, as we have shown, it has little ability on its own to gather information from
banks or Member States. Its ability to access data necessary for this role is limited.
Greater supervisory transparency is important. It facilitates a more efficient distribu-
tion of capital, increases market discipline on banks and contributes to a decreased
fractionalization of the European market for financial services. As such, it increases the
legitimacy of regulators’ outputs. It also enables the public to understand and evaluate how
supervisors contributed to these output. In so doing, it increases the legitimacy of actions
that the regulator takes against banks and is a basic requirement for making it possible to
hold regulators accountable. The EU receives justified flak that there is distance between
26 See «https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/supervisory-reporting/implementing-technical-standard-on
-supervisory-reporting».
27 This argument is justification for the creation of the Office of Financial Research under the Dodd-Frank Act in the United
States.
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European citizens and the institutions that make decisions on their behalf. Transparency in
terms of the data the supervisors themselves use to make decisions would allow the public,
and more realistically the various interest groups one finds in civil society, to judge
whether regulators chose actions consistent with protecting the public interest. Such ‘fire
alarms’ represent one small step towards addressing the democratic deficit that most
citizens think exists in Europe.
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